As of this early June writing, our welcomed spring season has turned into something far less celebratory in regard to prospects for a smooth and unfettered transition to health reform. Harsh economic and political realities concerning the financing and structure of a viable reform package have emerged. These pressure points threaten to unravel the fragile coalition of consumers, business leaders, providers, insurers, and organized labor that has been touted as the driving force for today's reform and the missing ingredient in prior reform efforts. Despite President Obama's admonition in his February 24 address to the nation that ''health reform cannot wait, it must not wait, and it will not wait another year'' and the administration's optimism that a bipartisan health reform package will be in place by summer's end, the process of developing a final reform proposal may be a painful and frustrating exercise for all interest groups involved.
In anticipation of what may be a contentious reform debate, the events of May provide a useful context for understanding the competing forces that over subsequent months are likely to shape the development of reform legislation or frustrate such efforts. These events have brought into sharp relief the fiscal reality of financing health care reform; the reality that a consolidated effort to impose cost containment discipline will be necessary to alleviate reform's financing pressures; the reality that creation of a new public health insurance plan will be a key point of contention in a bipartisan reform effort; and the reality that a newly minted media campaign will be waged to win the public's ''hearts and minds'' regarding alternative visions of health reform.
The Reality of Reform Financing
The report of the Medicare and Social Security trustees released May 12 provided an unsettling jolt of reality to arguably the most critical reform issue to date: how to finance a comprehensive reform plan that will significantly reduce the number of uninsured Americans. After two years of stable projections regarding the length of time until trust fund insolvency, updated projections in the trustees' report that accounted for the decline in federal revenues during the current recession revealed that the Medicare trust fund will be insufficient to pay all benefits beginning in 2017-two years earlier than predicted by the 2007 and 2008 reports. While the report continued to direct attention to the rising costs of health care as a primary challenge to Medicare's fiscal prospects, by implication its findings underscore the dual challenges facing President Obama: obtaining revenues sufficient to finance health care reform while at the same time seeking ways to shore up Medicare's financial status (Pear 2009a) .
Focusing specifically on health reform, Leonhardt (2009) has observed that a key financing challenge consists of coming up with a likely $90 billion shortfall in annual revenues necessary to cover the uninsured. This computation is based on the fact that the cost of reform (insuring roughly 50 million people) is projected to be around $120 billion a year, and that Congress is likely to approve only half of the president's original $60 billion annual down payment on reform (since legislators are unlikely to limit highincome families' deductions for charitable giving and other activities). In considering how to fill this $90 billion gap, the Senate Finance Committee sponsored a roundtable on financing health care reform, soliciting testimony from an expert panel. While panel members presented somewhat diverse perspectives on financing approaches, ranging from strategies to reform health care delivery to specific options for taxation, comments by Jon Gruber provide a cogent summary of the available revenue options. These include use of sin taxes on cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, and foods with high caloric and sugar content, assessments on providers, limitations of high-income families' itemized tax deductions (noted earlier), and elimination or capping of the tax deduction for employer contributions to health insurance. As a number of analysts have observed (e.g., Oberlander 2009), only the last option will yield a significant increase in tax revenues to help finance reform.
While several roundtable participants endorsed changing the tax treatment of health insurance, this strategy calls into play one of the ''hot button'' reform issues. Eliminating or capping the tax deduction for health insurance has been a perennial target of health economists and other policy analysts, who have argued that such policy would yield a more equitable and efficient provision of health insurance and health care. However, the current tax treatment of health insurance has been held sacrosanct by employees, employers, labor unions, and a number of Democratic politicians. Moreover, its preservation was a critical distinction between the health reform proposals offered during last fall's presidential campaign by Sen. John McCain, who proposed eliminating the tax deduction, and Obama, who strongly supported its continued application. Recently, however, the president has sent mixed signals regarding support for this provision.
The fiscal challenges facing Medicare, the recession's continuing impact on tax revenues, the apparent consensus among health care financing experts on the substantial revenue gains expected from altering the tax treatment of health insurance, and Congress' unwillingness to place more financing burdens on higher-income households have put the tax subsidy squarely in the sight of fiscal reformers. While the president remains committed to seeking other sources of revenue and reductions in health care costs to finance reform, fiscal realities may make altering the tax treatment of health insurance nearly irresistible. If fiscal pressures persist, avoiding the political flak from supporting a change in the health insurance tax deduction will be a real challenge and conundrum for the president, who likely would be criticized for ''flip flopping'' on an earlier promise, and would face some significant opposition in Congress and from other interest groups and organized labor.
Apart from avoiding the appearance of imposing what some may interpret as a new ''tax'' on middle-class families (something candidate Obama pledged to avoid), the president will also confront concerns that have been raised about the importance of the tax subsidy in preserving the stability of the employment-based health insurance system (Enthoven and Singer 1996; Monheit, Nichols, and Selden 1995/96; Buchmueller et al. 2008) . While there are ways to make reducing the tax subsidy more palatable (see the options in Gruber's testimony), the president will have to assess whether the gains from capping or eliminating the tax deduction for health insurance will be commensurate with the costs arising from political ill will and the loss of credibility.
The Promise of Cost Containment
As anyone following the reform debate must recognize by now, concerns over cost containment have dominated early policy discussions and have had a prominent role in shaping President Obama's early budgetary and stimulus initiatives. According to recent projections reported by the Council of Economic Advisors in ''The Economic Case for Health Reform,'' the current trajectory in health spending will consume more than a third of the gross domestic product (GDP) by the year 2040, an unsustainable commitment of resources. The president has made a firm commitment to cost containment, beginning with the application of improved information technology, better disease management, lower overhead costs for insurance, and reduced uncompensated care. Together, these factors were to save a typical family $2,500 in annual health insurance costs. However, there are mixed feelings as to whether these provisions will be effective. It also remains to be seen as to whether cost containment measures to rein in Medicare and Medicaid spending will be successful, such as the proposed reductions in payments to providers and the elimination of perceived overpayments to Medicare Advantage plans.
The month of May also saw an additional development on the cost containment front as representatives of health care businesses, the insurance industry, drug and device makers, doctors, hospitals, and a labor union pledged to reduce the growth in health care spending by 1.5% over the next decade (from 6.2% per year to 4.7%), a reduction of $2 trillion. On the surface this is a laudable and socially responsible commitment by industry leaders, but it remains to be seen whether this effort will have ''teeth'' or, as Pear (2009b) has observed, be viewed as a vague proposal and symbolic posturing designed to obtain a seat at the health reform table. Other observers have drawn a parallel between this pledge and that of the hospital industry's ''voluntary effort'' to reduce costs during the Carter administration, which yielded little relief.
While we will have to wait and see whether such a promise does indeed materialize and yield effective cost containment, the early signals have not been encouraging. No sooner than President Obama had touted these industry leaders they began to qualify their commitment, asserting that the president had overstated the coalition's position. The differences of opinion over the precise cost containment promise made at the White House meeting may be moot, however, since the issue of compliance with anti-trust legislation has been raised as a possible impediment to industry cooperation on this front. Thus, May ended with little assurance that any concrete plans to contain health care spending had moved forward.
The Public Health Insurance Plan
At the same time, congressional Democrats and Republicans were engaged in an intense exchange over including creation of a public health insurance plan in the health reform legislation. A public health plan was a key element in President Obama's reform proposal during the campaign, and it has remained a prime but contentious issue in the effort to forge bipartisan legislation. Designed to provide alternative health insurance choices to those offered by private insurers, and to instill competition and contain premium costs in the health insurance market, the public plan has been viewed by some Democrats as critical for meaningful reform. By contrast, Republican leaders and those in the private insurance sector have perceived the public plan as a threat to a viable private insurance industry.
Proponents claim a large, competing public health plan would have several advantages, including reduced administrative costs, sufficient market power to negotiate fees and reimbursement with providers, and the ability to inject more effective competition in an industry that has seen insurers exercise market power in a growing number of geographic areas (Dafney 2008) . By offering an alternative to private coverage and broadening the choices to potential enrollees, the public plan could stimulate greater insurance market competition and with its lower administrative costs, put downward pressure on premium costs. More importantly, in the president's own words, a key role for the public plan would be to ''keep the private insurance sector honest'' by making a different insurance provider available for enrollees who may have been affected by private insurers' selection practices, premium setting, and arbitrary reimbursement decisions. By contrast, the size and market power of such a public insurance entity remains a real concern to congressional Republicans, who see the public plan as a significant nudge toward a government-run, single-payer health care system, and to private insurers, who perceive a large public plan as yielding an unfair competitive and administrative cost advantage.
A critical part of developing a public sector plan involves the rules governing eligibility. It remains unclear as to whether enrollment in the public plan would be restricted to those currently uninsured or made available to all nonelderly citizens. While restricting the plan to the uninsured might avoid the kind of private sector insurance ''crowd-out'' associated with other public insurance expansions, it would significantly reduce the expected competitive clout of a public insurance entity. Broader eligibility-that is, permitting those with private coverage to enroll in the public plan-could have just the opposite effect; it would add significant competitive pressure in the marketplace but result in the insurance industry's worst fears: a defection of both the healthy and sick to the public plan, the loss of market share and revenue position, and the possible unraveling of both private nongroup and employer-based coverage.
As June began, it remained uncertain as to the status of the public plan and expectations that conflicting views could be resolved. Separate draft legislation prepared by Sens. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and Max Baucus (D-Montana) presented strikingly different visions for a public health plan. Kennedy's plan proposed a robust role for a public plan, while Baucus' concept saw the public plan as a backup to be invoked only if the private insurance sector failed to make significant gains in providing affordable coverage. As Pear (2009c) reported, Sen. Charles Schumer (D-New York) was developing a compromise in which a new public plan would be held to the same regulatory standards as private sector plans and would have to be financed by premiums rather than federal revenues. Future arguments for and against the public plan may depend in part on whether health insurance is mandated under reform legislation. Under this requirement, private insurers represented by America's Health Insurance Plans and the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association have pledged to make coverage available to people with pre-existing medical conditions, taking a step that would be implicit in implementation of a public health plan. However, it appears that not all insurers are willing to extend this pledge to the small employer market (Pear 2009c) .
Apart from its critical role in determining whether there will be bipartisan support for health reform legislation, the debate over the public health insurance plan will be compelling for what it says about our willingness to entrust coverage decisions to the private sector or whether the body politic sees reliance on more of a social insurance scheme essential to guaranteeing broad coverage and cost containment. This will be a telling debate, and we should all watch with interest.
The Media and the Message: ''Harry and Louise'' Once Again?
As Pear reported in The New York Times (2009d), the last week of May also witnessed the beginning of a media campaign focused on health care reform, with competing interest groups blitzing the airwaves with advertisements supporting and attacking legislation expected to emerge from Congress. As one might expect, a key point of contention is the expanded role of government in some proposals, most prominently illustrated by the president's support for the new public health insurance plan. Drawing upon disaffected patients and physicians in the British and Canadian health care systems as expert witnesses, some ads used the specter of a centralized health care system to rally opposition to reform-even though the specifics of reform proposals had yet to be finalized. Alternatively, ads supporting reform portrayed the private insurance sector as the villain in a health reform melodrama.
It may be naïve to expect that any of these media efforts will provide an accurate and informative message, or present viewers with an alternative vision of a health care reform package. At worst, we may find ourselves in the midst of another ''Harry and Louise'' moment (check YouTube if you don't remember) in which ''plain folk,'' depicted in a cozy kitchen setting, express their concern that a government-run health care system will limit health plan choice, threaten timely access to health care, limit physician decision making, or otherwise destroy health care as we know it. Readers may recall it was this sort of message that contributed to public opinion that helped to derail President Clinton's ill-fated Health Security Act. Responsible media portrayal of health reform proposals, as well as responsible and informed listening by those who are targets of such media efforts, will be critical to the success of any health reform proposal.
Conclusion
There is likely to be an aggressive effort by the administration and Democratic members of Congress to craft health reform legislation by the end of summer, and writing an editorial at the outset of that effort is fraught with the dangers inherent in crystal-ball gazing. The impediments to reform remain daunting; however, it will be gratifying if by summer's end they are remembered as historical inconveniences skillfully overcome through patient negotiation, compromise, and realistic expectations about the kind of reform package that our nation can afford. It would be tragic if health reform failed due to both political parties' unwillingness to make trade-offs or because of the contentious political and ideological posturing that has plagued for too long our national debate over social and economic policy. My hope is that by fall we will be witnessing history in the making, and that the United States will be on its way to joining other industrialized nations in providing health care coverage to all its citizens.
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